Hotel Protection Strategy in a Post-bin Laden World

Editor’s note: This is the second of a two-part series of columns on the risks of terrorism in the post-bin Laden world. Read part 1, “Terrorists still pose threats to hotels.”

Al Qaeda’s unprecedented success in attacking military, government, transportation and business targets with the aim of causing massive damage and casualties is not arguable. The question we must now face—and one I raised in part 1 of this series—is, “Are we safer in a post-bin Laden world?”

As previously outlined, we have with increasing success diminished Al Qaeda’s ability to launch large-scale attacks. All levels of the terrorist group have been disrupted in the absence of its leader. However, Al Qaeda continues to pose serious threats, including the Lone Wolf, the Fringe Cell and the Sleeper Cell (see part 1 for details). All three risks, in many ways, are more difficult for intelligence sources to detect and therefore to counter. Although now they are less likely to cause massive casualties, attacks by operatives from these three categories pose crippling risk to life, property and business operations.

The nature of terrorism is evolutionary. Al Qaeda will continue to adapt despite this serious setback. Splinter groups likely will form as a result of ideological, religious, tribal and geographical loyalties. Yes, the glue that has bound them may have been removed; nonetheless, their ideology lives and the result will remain the same. Attacks will continue until a socio-political solution is achieved. This will take a generation or more.

Protection strategies
In formulating a protection strategy for our business centers, hotels, resorts and executives, we should evaluate the nature of terrorist groups. They adapt to changing defensive strategies. They conduct surveillance of potential targets. They identify weaknesses. They thrive on targets that suffer terminal routine. They move against businesses that are administratively and logistically unprepared to detect, deter and prevent an attack. 

The peculiar difficulties posed in detection and deterrence also are compounded by the risk that an attack may be launched from within the ranks of your employed staff or by the very guests you are trying to protect, as well as a visitor or seemingly random intruder.

Protection against these risks follows several fundamental principles which form a layered defense that considers: all administrative policies, procedures and protocols; the integration of risk management and security departments; and the prolific use of IT and security technology.

Some special areas of consideration are:

The preceding is not meant to replace an all-inclusive assessment. It touches on a number of limited but primary principles and areas that require attention in order to promote further evaluation of your facilities, to promote consideration of new protocols and to provoke thought and management discussion. The risk of maintaining the status quo is, by the nature of the threat, unthinkable.